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Emily M. Crowe1 & Christina J. Howard2 & Angela S. Attwood1 & Christopher Kent1
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
In standard multiple object tracking (MOT) tasks the relative importance of the targets being tracked is equal. This is atypical of
everyday situations in which an individual may need to prioritize one target relative to another and so allocate attention unequally.
We report three experiments that examined whether participants could unequally split attention using a modified MOT task in
which target priority was manipulated. Specifically, we examined the effect of priority on participants’ magnitude of error and
used a distribution mixture analysis to investigate how priority affected both participants’ probability of losing an item and
tracking precision. Experiment 1 (trajectory tracking) revealed a higher magnitude of error and higher proportion of guessing for
low- compared with high-priority targets. Experiments 2 (trajectory tracking) and 3 (position tracking) examined how fine-
grained this ability is by manipulating target priority at finer increments. In line with Experiment 1, results from both these
experiments indicated that participants could split attention unequally. There was some evidence that participants could allocate
attention unequally at fine increments, but this was less conclusive. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate participants’
ability to distribute attention unequally acrossmultiple moving objects but suggest some limitation with the flexibility of attention
allocation.
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Introduction
Allocating attention to multiple objects as they move around
the environment is required for both everyday activities (e.g.,
driving a car and playing team sports) and real-world occupa-
tions (e.g., air traffic control and CCTV monitoring). This
ability has been extensively studied using the multiple object
tracking (MOT) task (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). In this task,
several objects are presented on screen, a subset of which are
temporarily identified as targets. Participants then track the
targets amongst visually similar distractors as they move ran-
domly around the screen. At the end of a trial, all objects stop
moving and participants are queried about the status (i.e., tar-
get or distractor) of an object, the trajectory of a target, or the
position of a target. Typically, participants can simultaneously
track approximately four objects (e.g., Intriligator &
Cavanagh, 2001; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Scholl,
Pylyshyn, & Feldman, 2001). Tracking performance is limited
by factors such as the number (Yantis, 1992), speed (Alvarez
& Franconeri, 2007), and spacing (Franconeri, Lin, Pylyshyn,
Fisher & Enns, 2008; Tombu & Seiffert, 2008) of objects.
Such limits on tracking indicate that there is a finite attentional
resource because tracking performance deteriorates as the
number of targets increases (e.g., Alvarez & Franconeri,
2007; Franconeri et al., 2008; Yantis, 1992). The structure of
this resource is debated, with some authors proposing a fixed
architectural system consisting of a limited number of discrete
pointers or slots (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1989) and others postulating
a more flexible, continuous pool of resources (e.g., Alvarez &
Franconeri, 2007).
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Fixed theories emerged following the consistent finding
that approximately four targets could be accurately tracked
in MOT tasks. Pylyshyn’s (1989) Fingers of Instantiation
(FINST) model consists of a fixed set (i.e., three, four, or five)
of indexes or slots that can be assigned to objects to provide a
connection between the outside world and visual representa-
tions in cognition. Cavanagh and Alvarez’s (2005) multifocal
theory posits that multiple foci of attention, rather than visual
indexes in the FINST model, track each object. These two
models suggest that tracking limitations are due to fixed ar-
chitectural constraints, namely the number of visual indices or
attentional foci.
Flexible resource theories suggest that there is a continuous
pool of the attentional resource that can be drawn upon for
tracking multiple objects. Alvarez and Franconeri (2007) pro-
posed the FLEX model (FLEXibly allocated indexes), which
suggests that objects are tracked by flexible indexes
(FLEXes), the total number of indexes is limited by the finite
resource. The limit on tracking is set by this shared resource
that determines the resolution of each FLEX such that when
fewer items are tracked, the tracking resolution is higher, con-
sistent with findings relating to spatial precision of target rep-
resentations (Howard & Holcombe, 2008; Howard, Masom,
& Holcombe, 2011). Kazanovich and Borisyuk (2006) pro-
posed that tracking is accomplished by a set of central oscil-
lators that synchronize with each other to label objects in the
focus of attention. Tracking is limited by the phase space of
such oscillators and so tracking is better with fewer
independent oscillators that are more sparsely distributed in
phase space. Franconeri et al. (2010) proposed the spatial in-
terference theory of MOT that suggests that the constraints on
tracking are determined by the spatial relationship between
targets and distractors (i.e., objects that participants do not
have to keep track of). This alternative to the FLEX model
suggests tracking errors are the result of distractors or other
targets entering the inhibitory surround (i.e., a spatial region)
of targets (Meyerhoff, Papenmeier & Huff, 2017).
A parallel debate persists in the visual short term-memory
(VSTM) literature in which a capacity limit of 3–5 items has
often been reported (Cowan, 2001). Such findings have led to
the proposal of fixed, slot-based theories of VSTM that sug-
gest that, irrespective of the complexity of objects, only a
limited, fixed number of items can be stored (e.g., Awh,
Barton & Vogel, 2007; Luck & Vogel, 1997). Other authors
(e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005)
propose that the number of objects that can be stored is more
flexible and determined by the complexity of objects.
Distinguishing between fixed and flexible mechanisms under-
lies a variety of questions within cognitive psychology that are
inherently related. One closely related task is multiple identity
tracking (MIT) in which participants must maintain informa-
tion about the identity of multiple objects as they move
(critically in MOT tasks the features of objects are identical,
whereas in MIT each tracked object has a unique feature to
identify it; Oksama & Hyönä, 2004). Oksama and Hyöna
(2008) suggest that, in some MIT tasks, target-relevant loca-
tion information is stored in VSTM and therefore tracking
limits are derived from the structure of the resource underlying
VSTM. Characterizing the mechanisms that underlie tracking
is therefore important to provide a greater understanding of
other, related cognitive processes as well.
Both fixed and flexible theories are based on results from
experiments using assumed equal attention splitting. Under
either the fixed or flexible theories, unequal attention splitting,
in which objects for tracking are allocated different amounts
of the attentional resource, is theoretically possible. As an
analogy to help distinguish the two accounts, water can be
used to represent the attentional resource underlying tracking.
Under a fixed account, water takes the solid form of ice cubes
and so the fixed number of ice cubes or slots can be unequally
distributed across objects in only a limited number of ways
(i.e., attention slots could be split between two targets accord-
ing to a limited number of ratios: 4:0; 3:1; 2:2 or 5:0; 4:1; 3:2).
In contrast, under a flexible account water takes the liquid
form and so can be flexibly allocated unequally in any way
(e.g., 37% : 63%). It is important to recognize that the struc-
ture of the attentional resource could fall anywhere between
these two points and so a key question, addressed here, is how
flexible the resource is.
Previous studies have demonstrated stimulus-driven un-
equal allocation. Liu et al. (2005) modified the typical MOT
task so that half the objects moved at 1 °/s and the other half at
6 °/s. There was no difference in tracking performance be-
tween fast- and slow-moving targets indicative of unequal
attention allocation. More specifically, more of the resource
could have been allocated to the faster (more demanding)
target, which resulted in similar tracking accuracy across both
speed conditions. Chen, Howe, and Holcombe (2013) com-
pared the speed limits at which participants could track a crit-
ical target when the second target was moving at either the
same or a slower speed. The speed limit for the critical target
was higher if the second target was moving slow rather than
fast. This suggests that participants allocated attention un-
equally with more attention available to allocate to the fast-
moving target when the secondary target was moving slower.
Together, these results provide evidence consistent with par-
ticipants’ ability to unequally allocate attention in a stimulus-
driven manner.
Some authors have also examined participants’ ability to
shift attention on-line (i.e., during a trial). Iordanescu,
Grabowecky, and Suzuki (2009) argued that targets in
crowded situations (i.e., those in danger of being mistaken
for distractors) were localized more precisely than uncrowded
targets, suggesting that more attention was allocated to these
Bhigh-risk^ targets. This supports the notion of unequal atten-
tion allocation and, additionally, suggests that the attention
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allocated to a given target can be changed during tracking.
Nevertheless, this result should be interpreted with some cau-
tion because proximity (to the nearest distracter) was not ma-
nipulated directly (i.e., object trajectories were randomly de-
termined) and, therefore, other display characteristics could
have been affected as well as proximity (Chen, Howe, &
Holcombe, 2013; see also contradictory findings by
Howard, Masom, & Holcombe, 2011). Howe et al. (2010)
adapted the Bsimultaneous-sequential paradigm^ (Eriksen &
Spencher, 1969) to examine whether attention could be
reallocated between targets during tracking. In the simulta-
neous condi t ion, a l l objec ts moved and paused
simultaneously, whereas in the sequential condition objects
were divided into two groups and moved alternatively.
There was no difference in tracking performance between
objects in the simultaneous and sequential conditions, which
suggests that participants could not reallocate attention
unequally between targets during tracking. Meyerhoff,
Schwan, and Huff (2018) conducted a series of experiments
to explore whether inter-object spacing guides visual atten-
tion. A bias towards temporarily close objects (both in term
of spatial attention allocation and eye movements), which
persisted even when the bias was harmful for the task, was
observed indicating both unequal attention allocation and
updating of attention allocation during a trial (see also
Zelinsky, & Todor, 2010). In other work Meyerhoff,
Papenmeir, Jahn, and Huff (2016) revealed that such unequal
allocation of the attentional resource in a stimulus-drivenman-
ner is advantageous to avoid confusion between targets and
close distractors indicating that attention can be flexibly allo-
cated during tracking.
Goal-directed unequal attention allocation inMOT has also
been documented. Cohen, Pinto, Howe, and Horowitz (2011)
modified the instructions given to participants in an MIT task.
In one condition, participants were instructed to prioritize the
locations over the identities of target and, in another, were
instructed to place equal emphasis on both location and iden-
tity information. Position-tracking performance was higher
when prioritization instructions were given demonstrating un-
equal attention allocation between the location and identity
information associated with the same target. However, to our
knowledge, no research has addressed whether participants
can split attention unequally between distinct targets in a
goal-directed manner (i.e., not to different features of the same
object). Examining the way in which participants can split
attention unequally in a strategic manner has the potential to
inform the debate regarding the structure of the attentional
resource underlying tracking because the amount of attention
allocated to a given object can be directly manipulated. This
allows examination of the resource-versus-performance func-
tion, the shape of which would be different for fixed and
flexible theories. As well as being theoretically important,
unequal allocation of attention is highly relevant to the real-
world in situations where one wishes to prioritize, and so
allocate more attention to one target over another target, which
nonetheless needs tracking.
Yantis (1992) showed goal-directed attention allocation
within an MOT framework. Participants who were instructed
to group all targets together displayed higher tracking accura-
cy than those who were given neutral tracking instructions.
This shows that participants modified their tracking strategy in
a goal-directed manner. Brockhoff and Huff (2016) combined
a typical MOT task with a non-interfering top-down identifi-
cation task. Participants were instructed to identify the behav-
ior of dynamic cartoon eyes. The cartoon eyes were the ob-
jects in the MOT task and the moving pupils cued either a
single target or single distractor by all rotating to look towards
that specific object. Participants could ignore or prioritize ob-
jects based on cueing, thus indicating goal-driven attention
allocation during the MOT task. Taken together, these results
demonstrate top-down mechanisms driving attentional alloca-
tion but do not provide any insight into the potential for top-
down unequal attentional allocation between two simulta-
neously tracked objects within a trial.
Goal-directed unequal attention allocation has been dem-
onstrated in other attention-based tasks in which participants
are instructed to allocate different proportions of their atten-
tion accordingly. Miller and Bonnell (1994) instructed partic-
ipants to pay a certain amount of attention to a line-length
discrimination task on the left side of the screen and the
remaining attention to the right side and revealed that
sensitivity increased with the proportion of attention devoted
to that side. Fitousi (2016) instructed participants to allocate
differential amounts of their attention to the top and bottom
halves of a face. Such instructions were effective in modifying
the amount of attention allocated to either half of the face, with
participants’ performance improving as a function of attention
allocation (Fitousi, 2016). Atkinson, Berry, Waterman,
Baddeley, Hitch, and Allen (2018) used probe frequencies
(i.e., how frequently a more valuable item was tested) to ex-
amine whether memory for an item was enhanced if partici-
pants were told it would be tested more frequently. Memory
was enhanced for the relatively more valuable item, indicating
that attention can be directed according to probe frequencies.
However, on the contrary, Chen, Howe, and Holcombe (2013)
claim that it would be difficult to induce participants to allo-
cate a specific proportion of attention to two targets during an
MOT task due to the extended duration of tracking across an
MOT trial. We empirically test this claim here.
The present series of experiments examined whether par-
ticipants could split attention unequally to multiple moving
objects in a goal-directed manner. We used modified MOT
tasks in which the priority of targets was manipulated to ex-
amine the effect of target priority on tracking performance.
Such modification resulted in the task encompassing compo-
nents of both MOT and MIT. MIT requires participants to
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maintain location-identity bindings during tracking
(Mayerhoff, Papenmeier, & Huff, 2017). This modified
MOT task requires participants to assign a priority (i.e., an
identity) to each target during a trial and therefore fits with
an MIT task. However, the index of tracking performance fits
more closely with the MOT literature because the targets’
position or trajectory is queried rather than an identity-
related response.
Experiment 1 examined whether participants could split
attention unequally between high- and low-priority targets.
Experiments 2 and 3 explored how fine-grained participants’
ability to allocate attention unequally was by manipulating the
target priorities at finer increments. Tracking performance was
measured as the absolute error between the actual and estimat-
ed trajectory (Experiments 1 and 2) or location (Experiment
3). In addition, we used a mixture distribution analysis (based
on Zhang & Luck, 2008) to estimate the precision of tracking
and the guessing rate. We hypothesized that the magnitude of
tracking error, proportion of guessing, and the precision of
tracking would be lower for the higher priority targets in all
three experiments indicative of strategic unequal attention
allocation.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants Twenty-seven undergraduate students from the
University of Bristol participated in return for course credit.
G*Power version 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007) was used to calculate sample size for all experiments.
Due to institutional constraints, we over-recruited for all ex-
periments. Based on existing data from our lab suggesting an
effect size of dz = 0.73, this sample size gave us at least a 95%
chance of observing a similar effect size, with alpha set at .05
for two-tailed tests.
Design Target priority was manipulated in a within-subject de-
sign with three levels: low (25%), equal (50%), and high (75%),
which reflected the veridical probability of a target being que-
ried over the course of the whole experiment. The primary
dependent variable was magnitude of angular error, indexed
by the degree of error from the queried target’s actual trajectory
(i.e., the direction it was heading in) to the participant’s reported
trajectory at the end of the trial. For example, if at the final
moment of the moving tracking display, the queried target
was last moving upwards and rightwards at an angle of 10°
clockwise from vertical, and the participants reported that it
wasmoving directly upwards, then this would constitute a mag-
nitude of angular error of 10°. The proportion of guess trials and
precision of representations, calculated from the mixture
modelling analysis were also dependent variables.
Procedure Stimulus displays were presented on a 17-in. CRT
monitor with a resolution of 1,024 x 768 pixels and a refresh
rate of 85 Hz. Viewing distance was approximately 40 cm.
Participants completed the task in a dimly lit room. A custom
made program was written using MATLAB version 2014b
(TheMathWorks, Inc, 2014) and the Psychtoolbox extensions
(Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997).
Figure 1 shows a timeline of one MOT trial. On each trial,
participants fixated a central black fixation cross and eight
black discs with a radius of 1.14° of visual angle, two targets
and six distractors, were presented on a mid-gray screen at the
start of each trial for 2,000 ms. Each target had one of three
numbers (25, 50, 75) presented on them denoting the likeli-
hood of this target would be queried at the end of a trial and so
indicating the relative importance of each target (i.e., the 75
and 25 targets were of high and low priority, respectively). On
any given trial, the combined values totalled 100. Participants
were given clear instructions and the opportunity to ask ques-
tions regarding how to allocate their attention before starting
the practice trials. The discs then moved randomly around the
screen at an average speed of 15.8° per second for between
5,000 and 8,000 ms (randomized for each trial) and underwent
perfectly elastic collisions whenever they collided with the
edge of the display or another disc. At the end of the trial,
all discs disappeared except one of the targets, which
remained on the screen. Participants clicked inside the target
to activate it which caused a Iine, 1.14° long, to extend from
the target’s center. The direction of the line was determined by
the position of the participant’s mouse click. Participants then
moved the line (using the mouse) to report the target’s trajec-
tory and clicked to confirm their answer. Feedback, consisting
of an arrow indicating the correct direction of heading, was
given on each trial for 2,000 ms, after which the next trial was
presented. Participants completed ten practice trials followed
by 250 experimental trials, the order of which was random-
ized, in ten blocks. The experiment lasted approximately 1 h.
Results and discussion
One participant was excluded due to their very high magni-
tude of error (and the model-based analysis suggested they
had a very high rate of guessing). Linear mixed effects models
(LMEs) were used to analyze the data using the lme4 package
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker, &Walker 2014) for the R computing
environment (R Development Core Team, 2014). Target pri-
ority was entered into the model as a fixed effect. As random
effects, there was a random intercept for subjects and a by-
subject random slope for the effect of target priority. P-values
were obtained by likelihood ratio tests of the full model in-
cluding terms related to priority against the model without
priority included. Post hoc comparisons were conducted
by comparing the slopes between two adjacent target
priorities.
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There was a main effect of priority, χ2 (2) = 16.60, p <
.001, whereby the magnitude of angular error decreased as
target priority increased, b = -0.277, SE = 0.06, t = 4.42.
Post hoc tests showed that there was a higher magnitude an-
gular error in the low-priority than in the equal-priority con-
dition (b = -0.48, t = 3.53, p = .006), but no difference between
the equal- and high-priority conditions (b = -0.08, t = 1.65, p =
.236) (see Fig. 2, left panel).
It is possible to interpret the distribution of error magnitudes
in order to examine the data further. This analysis distinguishes
contributions from two sources to differences in overall accura-
cy. The source is the guessing rate, where guesses may be due to
participants’ losing track or otherwise completely withdrawing
attention from a target. The second is the precision of represen-
tations (due to the amount of allocated attention) of targets1.
Analyzing data from a series of MOT experiments in which
participants judged the heading of a target object, Horowitz
and Cohen (2010, following Zhang & Luck, 2008) used a mix-
ture of a uniform distribution (representing the situation where a
target is lost and participants must guess) and von Mises (the
circular equivalent of the normal distribution, representing the
situation where participants have successfully tracked a target,
but with varying precision, as reflected in the spread of the
distribution). Under a pure slot-based model the precision
should not change as set size increases to any level (since a fixed
number of slots are allocated, and targets that are not tracked are
guessed, which is captured under the uniform guessing distribu-
tion). Flexible accounts predict that precision should decrease as
the number of items increases for any set size increase. Horowitz
and Cohen also tested two hybrid models (again following
Zhang & Luck, 2008): the slots + resources model (a fixed
number of slots, but a resource that can be unequally allocated
among those slots) and the slots + averaging model (a fixed
number of slots, but slots can be applied to more than one target
if below capacity). Both hybrid models make the same predic-
tion, however: If the number of targets to track is below capacity
the precision will decrease as the number of targets increase
(either because resources are spreadmore thinly, or because slots
cannot be shared) and asymptote if capacity is reached (as
additional targets are not tracked and are guessed, which is
captured under the uniform guessing distribution).
In line with the method used by Horowitz and Cohen (2010),
we fit a mixture of a uniform circular distribution and vonMises
distribution to each participants’ data for each level of priority.
We used the fitdistr function from theMASS package (Venables
& Ripley, 2002) with vonMises and uniform distributions func-
tions from the Bcircular^ package (Agostinelli & Lund, 2017).
The uniform circular distribution, representing the situation
where a participant makes a guess response, generates a random
value between -180 to 180. The von Mises distribution,
representing the situation where a participant has tracked a tar-
get, but to a varying degree of precision, is controlled by two
parameters: μ (the mean) and κ (the concentration parameter,
which determines the spread of the distribution). The mixture of
guessing and tracked errors was controlled byPG, the proportion
of guessing. The error distribution, ε, is therefore:
ε ¼ PG f uc −180; 180ð Þ þ 1−PGð Þ f VM μ;κð Þ ð1Þ
in which fuc is the uniform circular distribution function and
fvm is the von Mises distribution function. In our analysis
(following Horowtiz & Cohen, 2010) we fixed μ = 0 (i.e.,
average error was zero). We used R (R Core Team, 2015) to
estimate κ and PG values via maximum likelihood estimation
function fitdistr from the MASS package (Venables & Ripley,
2002) with von Mises and uniform distributions functions
from the Bcircular^ package (Agostinelli & Lund, 2017).
The mixture model fits (for data combined across partici-
pants), for each level of target priority, are shown in Fig. 3.
A higher precision value, κ, indicates a more leptokurtic dis-
tribution which demonstrates higher precision. Therefore, a
higher precision value indicates higher precision.
The κ and PG values, estimated for each participant and
each level of priority, were then entered into an LME analysis,
in an identical manner to the treatment of the magnitude of
angular error scores. There was an effect of target priority on
the proportion of guessing, χ2 (2) = 11.10, p = .004.
Participants demonstrated less guessing for high-priority tar-
gets, b = -0.002, SE = 0.001, t = 3.52. There was evidence for
a higher proportion of guessing in the low-priority compared
to the equal-priority condition, (b = -0.004, t = 0.32, p = .021).1 We thank H. Meyerhoff for suggesting this analysis.
Fig. 1 Trial timeline. (1) Eight discs were presented on screen. Discs
containing a value inside denote the likelihood of that target being
queried at the end of a trial. (2) All discs moved around the screen. (3)
All discs except one disappeared. Participants estimated what direction
the disc was heading it at the end of the trial using a rotatable pointer. (4)
Participants were given feedback. A second arrow was presented that
indicates the correct target trajectory. If a participant’s trajectory
estimate was within 12.5° of the correct trajectory, the arrow turned
green; otherwise, it turned red
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However, there was no difference in the proportion of guess-
ing in the high compared with the equal condition, (b = -0.004,
t = 1.65, p = .950) (see Fig. 2, right panel).
Finally, there was an effect of target priority on the preci-
sion of representations (κ), χ2 (2) = 10.52, p = .005, with the
precision increasing as target priority increased, b = -0.09, SE
= 0.03, t = 3.42 (see Fig. 2, right panel). Post hoc tests showed
that there was no difference in precision between any of the
adjacent levels of target priority (both t < 2.12 , p > .127).
Experiment 1 showed that participants guessed the trajec-
tory of the low-priority target more frequently than both the
equal- and high-priority target. Howard, Rollings, and Hardie
(2017) showed that participants’ attention to a target’s position
and attention to its motion characteristics are distinct.
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that all guess trials were as-
sociated with participants having no attention on that target.
However, it could be argued that the higher proportion of
guessing for low-priority targets indicates participants could
not split attention unequally and, therefore, sometimes either
lost the target completely (i.e., dropped the target) or confused
it with a distractor (i.e., swapped the target with a distractor).
However, this is likely an infrequent occurrence given the
relatively low proportion of guessing (the majority of trials
not modelled as involving a guess response) and a relatively
good level of tracking accuracy (indexed by the magnitude of
angular error) for the low-priority target. This indicates that
some attention was allocated to the low-priority target but, in
some cases, this was not sufficient to support updating of a
target’s trajectory, which resulted in an increase in guessing.
The effect of target priority on magnitude of error and pre-
cision shows that differential amounts of attention were allo-
cated to the high- and low-priority targets, respectively, indic-
ative of unequal attention allocation. This suggests some flex-
ibility with regard to the attentional resource underlying track-
ing. Specifically, more attention is allocated to the high-
priority target, which leads to lower magnitude or error and
higher precision. This finding does not fit with slot-based
accounts of attention allocation, which would predict that
the magnitude of angular error and precision of representations
would remain constant because each target is allocated one slot.
Flexible and hybrid models can, however, account for these
findings because under their assumptions attention is unequally
distributed between the two targets resulting in differences in
the three indexes of tracking accuracy.
This experiment does not provide insight into how fine-
grained this ability is. The extent to which attention splitting
is fine-grained refers to the precision with which a division of
attention is possible, in an analogous fashion to the way that
liquid water makes splitting infinitely more fine-grained than
crushed ice or ice cubes. Experiment 2 therefore examined
whether participants can split their attention unequally across
two targets with smaller disparities in their priority (e.g., 40%
vs. 60%) than used in Experiment 1 (i.e., 25% vs. 75%).
Exploring the extent to which attention is fine-grained has the
potential to distinguish between different models of MOT. For
example, under slots + averaging models, each target could be
assigned more than one slot and, therefore, unequal attention
splitting is theoretically possible. However, in slot + averaging
models, attention can only be split unequally in a finite number
of ways (i.e., 4-0; 3-1; 3-2). In contrast, under flexible accounts,
there is an unlimited number of ways that attention can be split.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 further investigated to what extent participants can
finely split their attention unequally across multiple moving ob-
jects. We manipulated the target priorities at finer increments (70,
60, 50, 40, and 30) than Experiment 1 to enable investigation of
the precision with which participants could allocate a pre-
specified amount of the attentional resource to a given target.
We conducted two identical studies, but one was completed in a
single-participant testing environment (i.e., each participant com-
pleted the study alone) and another was completed in a group
testing environment (i.e., participants completed the study in a
group of approximately 20 participants). The study aims and
hypothesis were preregistered on the Open Science Framework
and can be accessed at: https://osf.io/s5c6h/?view_only=
Fig. 2 Mean magnitude of error, proportion of guessing and precision of tracking for each target priority in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95%
within-subject confidence intervals using Morey (2008)
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ed239e4a584744249dd1bb53b4742e53 and https://osf.io/ety5r/?
view_only=75f6816e4ade4956a3cdfff270190ca5. For brevity
and power, we present the combined data from these studies.2
Method
Participants Seventy-nine undergraduate students from the
University of Bristol participated in return for course credit
(single testing = 36 participants; group testing = 43 partici-
pants). Based on existing data from our lab suggesting an
effect size of dz = 0.54, we powered for a similar effect size
of d = 0.5, which gave us at least an 80% chance of observing
a similar effect size, with alpha set at .05, based on two-tailed
tests, for each independent method of testing (i.e., single and
group testing power calculations were calculated separately)
2 The same qualitative pattern of results was observed when each experiment
was analyzed independently. When experiment was included as a between-
subject factor there were no reliable differences. Note, under a Bayesian frame-
work combining the data is equivalent to multiplying the Bayes factors from
each experiment (assuming the posterior from Experiment 1 is the prior for
Experiment 2; see Ly, Etz, Marsman, & Wagenmakers, 2018).
Fig. 3 Mixture model fits for the combined data across participants for Experiment 1 for each level of target priority. The density plot displays the actual
data and the black line shows the model fit. The proportion of guessing (PG) and precision of tracking (κVM) parameters are also detailed
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Design Target priority was manipulated in a within-subject
design with five levels: very low (30), low (40), equal (50),
high (60), and very high (70), and reflected the true likelihood
of a target being queried over the course of the whole exper-
iment. The dependent variables were the same as in
Experiment 1.
Procedure The procedure was identical to that used in
Experiment 1 apart from, when providing their response, par-
ticipants had to indicate whether they thought they were track-
ing the queried target at the end of the trial or not by clicking
the left mouse button for Btracked^ and the right mouse button
for Bnot tracked^ (labels were put on the mouse buttons) .3
This click also activated the response indicator line.
Participants then used the same mouse button to finalize their
response, as detailed in Experiment 1. In the group testing
experiment stimuli were presented in a 1,024 x 768 pixels
window of a 21-in. LCD monitor (1,920 x 1,080 resolution)
with a refresh rate of 60 Hz.
Results and discussion
Two participants were removed from the analysis because
their overall magnitude of error was very high (and the
model-based analysis suggested they had very high levels of
guessing). The LME analysis and post hoc comparisons used
were identical to Experiment 1.
There was an effect of target priority on the magnitude of
angular error, χ2 (2) = 121.49, p < .001, which decreased as
target priority increased, b = -0.467, SE = 0.04, t = 12.20 (see
Fig. 4, left panel). Post hoc tests showed no difference in the
magnitude of angular error between the very low- and low-
priority conditions (b = -0.13, t = 0.14, p = .639). Magnitude
of angular error was higher in low compared with equal (b = -
0.90, t = 6.49, p < .001), equal compared with high (b = -0.29,
t = 2.50, p = .049), and high compared with very high priority
conditions (b = -0.42, t = 5.40, p < .001), respectively.
Figure 5 shows the mixture model fits all the data combined
for all participants, for each level of target priority. Fitting the
models to each individual participant showed that there was an
effect of priority on the proportion of guesses (Pg), χ2 (2) =
43.65, p < .001 (Fig. 4, right panel). Participants demonstrated
less guessing for higher priority targets, b = -0.003, SE = 0.001,
t = 6.85. Post hoc comparisons revealed no difference in the
proportion of guessing between the very low- and low-priority
targets (b = -0.001, t = 0.39, p = .923). Proportion of guessing
was higher for the low- compared with equal-priority targets (b
= -0.006, t = 3.58, p = .003). However, there was no difference
between the equal- and high-priority targets, (b = -0.001, t =
0.69, p = .787). A lower proportion of guessing was revealed in
the very high- compared with the high-priority condition (b = -
0.005, t = 4.95, p < .001).
There was also evidence for an effect of target priority on the
precision of representations κ, χ2 (2) = 27.59, p < .001, with
precision increasing as target priority increased (b = 0.15, SE =
0.03, t = 5.18) (see Fig. 4, right panel). There was no difference
in precision between the very low- and low-, equal- and high-,
and high- and very high-priority targets (t < 1.86, p > .184).
There was, however, higher precision in the equal- compared
with low-priority condition, b = 0.25, t = 0.11, p = .026.
In line with Experiment 1, the effect of target priority on the
magnitude of angular error and proportion of guessing suggests
that participants can split attention unequally. Specifically, more
attention was allocated to the high-priority target leading to a
lower magnitude of error, and overall a lower proportion of
guessing. Taken together, this result suggests flexible allocation
of the attentional resource and, therefore, does not fit with pure
slot-based accounts of attention allocation, which would predict
no effect of target priority because, under this account, each
target is allocated a single slot.
Experiment 2 explored the extent to which attention split-
ting is fine-grained, namely the precision with which attention
can be divided. There was some evidence for fine-grained
spitting because there was a difference in magnitude of angu-
lar error and proportion of guessing for the high and very high
targets. However, there was no evidence for a difference in
these parameters between the very low- and low-priority tar-
gets. Since there was only limited evidence for fine-grained
3 We did not include analysis of this aspect of the design as so few participants
actively engaged with it, but note the same qualitative pattern of results was
observed when Buntracked^ trials were excluded.
Fig. 4 Mean error in magnitude of error, proportion of guessing, and precision of tracking for each target priority in Experiment 2. Error bars represent
95% within-subject confidence intervals using Morey (2008)
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splitting, the results cannot distinguish between flexible and
hybrid models of attention. No difference in tracking perfor-
mance between the very low- and low-priority targets could be
taken as evidence for a slots + averaging model of attention in
which three and one slot(s) were allocated to the high- and
low-priority target, respectively, on any given trial, thus
resulting in the same pattern of results for both the unequal
splitting conditions (i.e., high and low). However, better track-
ing performance in the very high compared with high pattern
fits with a flexible or slots + averaging model, which would
predict a graded decrease in magnitude of angular error and
proportion of guessing as target priority increases.
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated unequal attention splitting
in a trajectory-tracking task. Since position tracking does not
automatically recruit trajectory-tracking processing during
MOT, it has been suggested that position tracking may be a
more primary representation during the process of tracking
(Howard, Rollings, & Hardie, 2017). To further explore the
extent to which unequal attention splitting was possible within
a MOT-paradigm, we replicated Experiment 3 using a position-
Fig. 5 Mixture model fits for all participants for Experiment 2 for each level of target priority. The density plot displays the actual data and the black line
shows the model fit. The proportion of guessing (PG) and precision of tracking (κVM) parameters are also detailed
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tracking task. This will also potentially providemore insight into
the fine-grained nature of unequal attention splitting.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 examined whether participants could allocate
attention unequally using a different measure of tracking ac-
curacy, to further generalize our findings. Tracking perfor-
mance in Experiment 3 was indexed by the magnitude of
spatial error (we report pixels because we did not standardize
viewing distance due to the nature of group testing) from the
correct final position of the queried target to the participant’s
reported final position of the queried target. More specifically,
we used the x, y co-ordinates of the target’s center to index the
actual final location and the x, y co-ordinates of the partici-
pant’s click to index their position reports. The study aims and
hypothesis were preregistered on the Open Science
Framework and can be accessed at: https://osf.io/ety5r/?
view_only=75f6816e4ade4956a3cdfff270190ca5.
Method
Participants Forty undergraduate students from the University
of Bristol participated in return for course credit. Based on
existing data from our lab suggesting an effect size of dz =
0.66, we powered for a similar effect size of d = 0.5, which
gave us at least an 80% chance of observing a similar effect
size, with alpha set at .05 for two-tailed tests.
Design Target priority was manipulated in a within-subject
design with five levels: very low (30), low (40), equal (50),
high (60), and very high (70), and reflected the true probability
of a target being queried over the course of the whole exper-
iment. The dependent variable was the magnitude of error
(pixels) from the correct final location of the queried target
to the participant’s reported final location of the queried target.
Procedure The task was identical to that used in Experiment 2
(group participation condition) apart from the substitution of the
trajectory-tracking task with a position-tracking task. At the end
of a trial, there was an aural cue that instructed participants to
click on the location that they thought the cued target had last
occupied. This prompt instructed participants to localize the
target (i.e., click the location on the screen where they thought
the center of the queried target with the priory stated through the
headphones was at the end of the movement). In the 50/50
conditions, the two targets were labelled with either an ‘X’ or
a ‘Y’ at the start of the trial, and participants were cued at the
end of the trial using these labels. Feedback, consisting of a
green disc indicating the correct location of the queried target,
was given on each trial for 2,000 ms,d after which the next trial
started. Viewing distance was approximately 40 cm.
Results and discussion
The LME analysis used was identical to Experiment 2. One
participant from the analysis because their overall magnitude
of error was very high (and the model-based analysis sug-
gested they had very high levels of guessing). All trials on
which the size of distance error was greater than 605 pixels
were excluded. This value was chosen as it represented the
95th percentile of the data and the density plots showed less
uniform responding thereafter.
There was an effect of target priority on the size of the
distance error, χ2 (2) = 67.97, p < .001, with distance error
decreasing as target priority increased, b = -1.75, SE = 0.20, t
= 8.91. Post hoc comparisons showed evidence for smaller
distance errors in the high compared with the equal condition,
(b = -1.67, t = 2.65, p = .040), and equal compared with the
low priority condition (b = -2.99, t = 3.80, p = .002) (see Fig.
6, left panel). There was also evidence for smaller error dis-
tances in the very high compared with the high condition, (b
=-1.06, t = 3.10, p = .014). There was no evidence for a
difference in tracking error between the very low-priority
and the low-priority condition, b = -0.72, t = 1.31, p = .430.
In order to fit the data from Experiment 3, we used a dif-
ferent mixture distribution analysis because the error data dis-
tribution was linear and positively skewed. We used aWeibull
distribution for the tracked items and a uniform distribution
(from 0 to 605) for the guessing distribution. The dweibull
function used in the analysis of is part of the base distribution
package Bstats^ (R Core Team, 2015). The Weibull has the
advantage that both the shape and scale can vary, and can
approximate other distributions, including the normal. The
error distribution, ε, is therefore:
ε ¼ PG f U L ¼ 0;U ¼ 605ð Þ þ 1−PGð Þ f WB η;βð Þ ð2Þ
in which Pg is the guessing rate, L and U are upper and lower
bounds for the uniform distribution function fU, and η and β
are the scale and shape of the Weibull distribution function,
fWB. Figure 7 shows the mixture model fit to the combined
data from all participant for each level of priority. As is evident
in the plots, the scale parameter η is capturing the spread of the
data, which we interpret as the precision of tracked items.
There was an effect of priority on the proportion of guesses,
χ2 (2) = 44.18, p < .001. Participants demonstrated less guess-
ing for high-priority targets, b = -0.004, SE = 0.001, t = 6.40
(see Fig. 6, right panel). Post hoc comparisons showed evi-
dence for a lower proportion of guessing in the high compared
with the equal condition, (b = -.005, t = 4.87, p < .001), and
equal compared with the low-priority condition, (b = -.007, t =
3.68, p < .003) (see Fig. 6, left panel). There was also evidence
for lower proportion of guessing in the very high compared
with the high condition, (b = -.0.003, t = 2.81, p = .027). There
was, however, no evidence for a difference in the proportion
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of guessing between the very low-priority and the low-priority
conditions, b = .002, t = 0.51, p = .819.
There was no evidence for an effect of target priority on the
shape, as measured by β, of representations, χ2 (2) = 0.71, p =
.701. There was, however, evidence for an effect of target
priority on scale, as measured by β, χ2 (2) = 23.34, p <
.001. As target priority increases, the distribution becomes
more concentrated, b = 1.25, SE = 0.25, t = 5.02 (see Fig. 6,
right panel). Post hoc comparisons revealed evidence for in-
creased concentration for the low- compared with very low-
priority condition, b = 4.79, t = 3.37, p = .007. There was
greater concentration in the equal- compared with the low-
priority condition, b = -1.31, t = 2.75, p = .030, and high
compared with equal, respectively, b = 0.17, t = 1.17, p =
.004. The distribution for the very high- compared with the
high-priority targets was also more concentrated b = 0.22, t =
1.15, p < .001.
Overall, the position-tracking task revealed evidence for
unequal attention allocation that cannot be accounted for by
fixed, slot-based models of attention. There was some evi-
dence for more fine-grained attention allocation for the higher
priority, with a smaller size of position error and lower pro-
portion of guessing in the very high- compared with the high-
priority condition. There was, however, no evidence for fine-
grained splitting for the lower priority targets (i.e., 30 vs. 40).
This pattern of results is similar to Experiment 2, with partic-
ipants not differentiating between allocating their attention to
a very low- and low-priority target.
General discussion
In a series of three experiments, we investigated whether par-
ticipants can split attention unequally to multiple moving ob-
jects. Results from all experiments revealed some evidence for
unequal attention allocation according to strategic top-down
control. This is in line with the existing literature documenting
top-down, goal-driven attention allocation in MOT
(Brockhoff & Huff, 2016) and visual search (Jiang et al.,
2015; Navalpakkam et al., 2010; Shomstein & Johnson,
2013). Such findings replicate research demonstrating un-
equal attention allocation during MOT in response to instruc-
tions (Cohen, Pinto, Howe, & Horowitz, 2011; Yantis, 1992),
further supporting the efficacy of using goal-directed instruc-
tions to manipulate participants’ attention allocation (Bonnel
& Miller, 1994; Fitsoul, 2016).
Across all experiments, the proportion of guessing de-
creased as target priority increased. Guessing in response to
a prompt to report one aspect of a target cannot be equated
with a complete withdrawal of attention to all other aspects of
that target, since, for example, position and trajectory
encoding for targets appear to be distinct processes
(Howard, Rollings, & Hardie, 2017). Therefore, for any given
modelled guessing response, this may not necessarily indicate
a complete withdrawal of attention to that target if its trajec-
tory (Experiments 1 and 2) or its position (Experiment 3) is
not known. Even if the participant has completely withdrawn
attention from a target, there are two possible reasons that
could lead a participant to produce a guess response. They
could drop the target (i.e., lose track of it) or swap the target
(i.e., confuse it with a distractor). We propose that a combina-
tion of these events occur more frequently in the low-priority
condition than in the high-priority condition because less at-
tention is allocated to the low-priority target, which constitutes
unequal attention allocation. It could be argued that the in-
creased proportion of guessing for low-priority targets com-
pared to high-priority targets reflects participants’ inability to
split attention unequally. Specifically, participants may have
dropped the low-priority target on some trials and, therefore,
on those occasions performed single object tracking, which
could be responsible for an increase in the precision for the
high-priority target. This is unlikely because the guessing rate
and magnitude of error is relatively low across all experiments
and indicates non-guessing responses for the lower priority of
targets on the majority of trials. Using electrophysiological
markers and behavioral experiments, Drew, Horowitz, and
Vogel (2013) distinguished between swapping and dropping
trials. The relative frequency of these events is not
Fig. 6 Mean error in size of position error, proportion of guessing and scale of distribution for each target priority in Experiment 3. Error bars represent
95% within-subject confidence intervals using Morey (2008)
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distinguishable in the current data and, therefore, research
using such measures within an unequal splitting MOT para-
digm is required.
Experiments 2 and 3 assessed how fine-grained unequal
attention allocation is. The results from these experiments indi-
cate that, on a given trial, participants can allocate more and less
attention to the high- and low-priority targets, respectively.
However, the results were less conclusive with regard to how
fine-grained such attention splitting is. There was some
evidence for fine-grained splitting at higher levels of priority
(e.g., between 60 and 70), but not at the lower end of the priority
range (e.g., 30 and 40). Perhaps participants could not distin-
guish between what constitutes 30% and 40% of their attention-
al resource or were not sufficiently motivated by the task to
make the distinction, and so operated according to a binary
Bmore^ or Bless^ mechanism. Alternatively, it is possible that
30% of the attentional resource was sufficient to accurately
track the very low-priority targets and therefore that the task
Fig. 7 Mixture model fits for all data combined across participants for
Experiment 3 for each level of target priority. The histogram plot displays
the actual data and the black line shows the model fit. The proportion of
guessing (PG) precision of tracking (β the Weibull shape), and scale (η)
parameters are also detailed
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was not sensitive enough to distinguish between highly similar
target priorities. It is also important to recognize that the re-
sponse procedure used in our experiments is different to the
typical MOT literature in which participants must indicate
whether a probed object is a target or a non-target that may
have contributed to participants adopting different tracking
strategies. However, trajectory and position tracking have been
previously shown to be appropriate and sensitive measures of
tracking performance that declines with set size (Horowitz &
Cohen, 2010; Howard, Rollings & Hardie, 2017).
A persistent debate in the literature surrounds the structure
of the attentional resource underlying tracking. Results from
all experiments suggest that participants can split attention
unequally indicating some flexibility to the attentional re-
source. This does not fit with fixed architecture theories of
tracking, which would predict that each target is allocated
one slot, and, therefore, there would be no difference in track-
ing performance. Findings from Experiment 2 and
Experiment 3 regarding the fine-grained nature of attention
splitting are less conclusive. There is some evidence that par-
ticipants may be able to only split according to a binary mech-
anism (i.e., high and low priority) that fits with slots + aver-
aging models, which assume that more than one slot can be
allocated to a high-priority target. In both the unequal attention
splitting conditions (i.e., 30/70; 40/60) three slots and one slot
can be allocated to a high- and low-priority target, respective-
ly, and therefore no difference in tracking accuracy is ob-
served. Under this account, no further precision in unequal
splitting would be observed, since the slots cannot be
subdivided any further, and therefore this model explains the
data presented here. Experiment 2 revealed evidence for a
difference in magnitude of angular error and proportion of
guessing that indicates fine-grained attention allocation. This
fits with pure flexible and slots + resources models, which
predict a graded increase in tracking-performance measures
as target priority increases. Further research is needed to dis-
tinguish between these accounts.
Our results fit most closely with hybrid models of attention
allocation. Pure flexible accounts require an additional asser-
tion that not only can the resource be divided in a fine-grained
manner, but that this fine-grained allocation of the resource
can be divided out unequally between targets. A relevant anal-
ogy here might be the division of pay between workers: if 40
units (dollars, euros, etc.) of currency are to be shared between
four workers, the fixed account would suggest that there are
four ten-unit notes, which can be shared out, where a flexible
account would suggest that there are in fact 4,000 subunits
(e.g., cents) to be shared out. The flexible account asserts that
this sum could be divided amongst 4,000 workers (actually an
infinite number, but this requires subdivision of cents into
electronic payments of less than 1 cent for the purpose of this
analogy). However, the flexible account has so far been silent
on whether or not this payment could be made unequally
between workers, with some receiving more than others.
The evidence we present here suggests that this is the case,
that attention can be flexibly and unequally divided. How this
unequal splitting of attention is achieved by the visual system
does, however, warrant further theoretical consideration in the
MOT literature.
The guessing rate remained relatively low throughout; in-
deed, the mean guessing rate for the lowest priority targets
across Experiments 2 and 3 was 29%. This is important be-
cause it suggests that on the majority of trials, participants did
not appear to adopt the strategy of only single-object tracking
of the high-priority target, in which case we might expect
nearer a 100% guess rate for the lower priority target.
However, the results reported were averaged across trials
and so it is possible that participants did not attempt to track
multiple objects on each and every trial. Specifically, it is
possible that participants engaged in single-object tracking
and used target priority to determine the number of trials on
which they tracked only the high- or low-reward target.
However, this is unlikely because there were only two targets,
which is below the proposed four-object capacity limit for
tracking. Whereas examining within-trial behavior was not
the main focus of this article, future research should focus
on how participants achieve this unequal splitting. One way
to directly investigate this would be by probing both targets at
the end of a trial to gain insight into the relationship between
tracking accuracy on the two simultaneously presented tar-
gets. A positive correlation between tracking performances
would indicate that participants were engaging in multiple-
object tracking because performance on a given trial is broad-
ly either good or bad for both targets. A negative correlation
would indicate that participants were engaging in single-
object tracking because, as accuracy on one target (i.e., the
tracked target) increases, accuracy on another target (i.e., the
untracked target) decreases. No correlation between perfor-
mance on the two targets might be consistent with participants
attention fluctuating within a trial and, therefore, tracking a
single object at the cost of another.
Although the studies presented indicate unequal attention
allocation when performance is examined at the trial level, it
is not possible to determine participants’ attention allocation
during the trial. It is possible that participants were tracking
one target at a time but switched between targets during the
trial, spending relatively more time on higher priority targets.
Some have argued that attention is flexibly allocated in exper-
iments investigating stimulus-driven unequal attention alloca-
tion (e.g., Iordanescu, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2009).
Therefore, it is possible that prioritization and unequal attention
allocation only occurs when, for example, tracking becomes
difficult as in response to reduced inter-object spacing
(Meyerhoff, Schwan, & Huff, 2018). Future research is there-
fore required to examine how attention is allocated at different
points within a trial. One possible avenue is to use a dot probe
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detection task (e.g., Meyerhoff, Schwan, & Huff, 2018) in
which probes are randomly presented within the tracking phase
or two lateralized tracking areas are utilized to index attention
allocation at different timepoints in a trial. Such research will
also provide detail into the interplay between stimulus-driven
and goal-directed attentional mechanisms within MOT.
A further consideration of the tasks we have used is
that equal and unequal attention splitting are potentially
different tasks. Traditional MOT tasks might best be
characterized primarily as an equal attention-splitting
task, although some have argued for unequal attention
spli ts and attention reallocation in MOT (e.g.,
Iordanescu et al., 2009). The unequal attention-splitting
MOT task used in these experiments also has a multiple
identity-tracking component because participants must
assign a target priority (a form of identity) to each of
the targets. Identity encoding is not automatic during
MOT (Pylyshyn, 2004; Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999) and
has been shown to require resources (Cohen, Pinto,
Howe & Horowitz, 2011), in part due to identity-
location binding processes (Saiki, 2002; Oksama &
Hyönä, 2008). Future research should examine whether
attention can be divided unequally in a purer MOT par-
adigm that does not require identity-location bindings.
For example, distinct tracking areas or Bcages^ (e.g.,
Howard and Holcombe, 2008) could be presented on
each trial and each tracking area would be associated
with a certain likelihood of being probed. This design
would not require participants to maintain identity-
location bindings because there would only be one tar-
get in each tracking area with, for example, three
distractors.
These data demonstrate that participants can split attention
unequally in MOT tasks. There is, however, limited evidence
that this ability is fine-grained. These findings are not consis-
tent with fixed, slot-based accounts of attention allocation.
Pure flexible accounts could account for the results, but with
the additional assumption that attention may be divided un-
equally between targets. Hybrid models, specifically the slots
+ averaging model, explain the data reported here without
further assumptions. Since these models have traditionally
been applied to memory tasks, similar models specific to
MOT that can account for the flexibility of attention demon-
strated here, are required.
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